RFRA Cases

Iowaska Church of Healing v. United States, (D. D.C, March 31, 2023)

Oral Argument - March 11, 2024

Arizona Yage Assembly v. Garland, (D. Arizona, May 4, 2023)

The bulk of Defendants’ arguments stem from the fact that Plaintiffs have not sought an exemption from the applicability of the CSA.  The DEA promulgated the “Guidance” in 2009 in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).  However, in 2012 the Ninth Circuit addressed a similar argument as Defendants make here, and the court refused “to read an exhaustion requirement into RFRA where the statute contains no such condition.”  Oklevueha I, 676 F.3d at 838 (stating that “the Supreme Court has reviewed a RFRA-based challenge to the CSA without requiring that the plaintiffs first seek a religious use exemption from the DEA”) (citing O Centro, 546 U.S. 418).  Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized that RFRA “plainly contemplates that courts would recognize exceptions [to the CSA]—that is how the law works.”  Id. (quoting O Centro, 546 U.S. at 434).
The Court will not depart from that clear precedent.  Accordingly, the Defendants’ alternative request that the Court stay the case to allow Plaintiffs to apply for an exemption is denied.

Church of the Eagle and the Condor v. Garland, (D. Arizona, March 20, 2023)

Settlement Update
final_cec_agreement__signed_.pdf

Van Kush v. DEA, (D.D.C., June 6, 2022)

Missing from both the original complaint and the proposed amended complaint are factual allegations describing the religious practice at issue, identifying which controlled substance is essential to the religious practice, stating how the substance is used in his religious practice, and explaining how the CSA substantially burdens that practice.

Arizona Yage Assembly v. Garland, 595 F.Supp.3d 869 (D. Arizona, March 30, 2022)

Though there is a valid regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 1307.03, requiring persons seeking exemptions to file a written request with the DEA Office of Diversion Control, the Ninth Circuit held persons seeking a RFRA exemption from the DEA are not required to exhaust the administrative remedy under § 1307.03.[Footnote 7] See Oklevueha I, 676 F.3d at 838 (“We decline . . . to read an exhaustion requirement into RFRA where the statute contains no such condition and the Supreme Court has not imposed one.”) (internal citation omitted).
[Footnote 7] Judge Orrick of the Northern District of California noted that even a new substantive agency rule might not be able to impose a binding administrative exhaustion requirement under Oklevueha I. (Doc. 57 at 14) (“[I]t is possible that regardless of any new regulations [DEA may promulgate], the plaintiffs will not have to seek an exemption from the DEA prior to seeking judicial redress.”).
To raise a claim under the APA, Plaintiffs are required to petition for an exemption or a new rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, 706; Madsen, 976 F.2d at 1220. Then, if the DEA denied the petition or refused to respond to it, Plaintiffs could argue they were harmed because the DEA failed to comply with the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), (2) (setting forth the standard of review of agency action).

Soul Quest Church of Mother Earth v. United States, Case No. 6:20-cv-701-WWB-DCI (M.D. Florida, March 4, 2022)

Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden in showing that this Court can exercise jurisdiction over this case. At the very least, because the DEA has provided a final decision that rests, at least in part, on a determination under the CSA that is separate and apart from any decisions under RFRA, it appears that this Court is divested of jurisdiction pursuant to § 877 over that determination, which is inextricably intertwined with the issues raised and the relief requested in this case. Thus, this case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court need not address Defendants’ remaining arguments.

Okleveuha Native American Church v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir., 2016)

RFRA itself provides no explicit definition of “substantial burden.” However, we have held that the meaning of the term can be ascertained by looking to “a body of Supreme Court case law” decided before Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), the case that was the impetus for RFRA’s passage. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1067-68; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)-(b) (explaining RFRA’s attempt to restore pre-Smith protections for religious exercise). Looking to that pre-Smith case law, we have held that a substantial burden under RFRA exists in a context such as this one “only when individuals are ... coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions....” Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070.[Footnote 1]
[Footnote 1] Mooney and Oklevueha make no allegation that the CSA’s prohibition on cannabis “force[s] [them] to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit,” the other kind of substantial burden we have recognized under RFRA. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070.

United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir., 2016)

The record in this case succeeds where the record in O Centro fell short because, as the district court concluded, in this case there is specific evidence that the Ministry’s distribution methods created a realistic possibility that cannabis intended for members of the Ministry would be distributed instead to outsiders who were merely feigning membership in the Ministry and adherence to its religious tenets. Additionally, the government’s interest in this case is all the more compelling given the Ministry’s well-publicized willingness to extend membership in the Ministry (with all that that entails) to minors.

Okleveuha Native American Church v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 838 (9th Cir., 2012)

Likewise, we are unpersuaded by the Government's assertion that Plaintiffs’ request for prospective relief is unripe because Plaintiffs did not request an exception to the CSA from the DEA. See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.03 (“Any person may apply for an exception to the application of any provision of this chapter by filing a written request with the Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, stating the reasons for such exception.”). The Government argues that we should require Plaintiffs to exhaust this administrative remedy, because doing so would allow the DEA to apply its expertise to Plaintiffs' claim, possibly moot the case if the claim is granted, and help build a record for judicial review.

We decline, however, to read an exhaustion requirement into RFRA where the statute contains no such condition, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4, and the Supreme Court has not imposed one. Indeed, the Supreme Court has reviewed a RFRA-based challenge to the CSA without requiring that the plaintiffs first seek a religious use exemption from the DEA. Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006). In so doing, it recognized that RFRA “plainly contemplates that courts would recognize exceptions [to the CSA] — that is how the law works.” Id. at 434, 126 S.Ct. 1211.

Church of the Holy Light of the Queen v. Mukasey, 615 F.Supp.2d 1210, 1211-1212 (D. Oregon, 2009)

Guided by the unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court in a very similar case, Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006) (UDV III), I conclude that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4, requires that plaintiffs be allowed to import and drink Daime tea for their religious ceremonies, subject to reasonable restrictions.

United States v. Lepp, Case No. 3:04-cr-00317-MHP (N.D. California, August 14, 2008)

O Centro can be distinguished on the facts. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court’s finding that the “evidence on diversion was virtually balanced.” Id. at 426 (quotation omitted). The Court emphasized that “thinness of any market for hoasca, the relatively small amounts of the substance imported by the church, and the absence of any diversion problem in the past.” Id. The situation here is dissimilar. Indeed, the market for marijuana is anything but thin, the amount of marijuana that Lepp possessed, almost 25,000 plants covering several acres, is certainly not a small amount and there is ample evidence of diversion.

Multi Denominational Ministry of Cannabis and Rastafari v. Mukasey, Case No. 3:06-cv-04264-VRW (N.D. California, March 31, 2008)

It should go without saying that the reasoning in O Centro Espírita does not apply to plaintiffs’ distribution of tens of thousands of marijuana plants.