Keep in mind, the legal issues below are not relevant during the trial stage.  The judge granted collateral estoppel on my constutional claims, but the case is proceeding under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  Unless collateral estoppel stops the case, it’s harmless (unless I can figure out how it harms me).  The RFRA provides the same compelling interest test the constitutional claims provide.  There is no difference.  I might raise (or simply mention) the constitutional claims on appeal, if the case ends up in the Iowa Supreme Court.  For now, just skip to my direct examination and cross examination questions for the witnesses.
Another odd thing is that without the RFRA, it was impossible to sue the state on constitutional claims in a state court because of sovereign immunity.  This case would have never ended up in front of this judge without the RFRA.  The only way to sue the state before the RFRA was in a federal court using 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi, 146 S. Ct. 916, 607 US ___, 224 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2026).  After being stopped by collateral estoppel, Olivier appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals and that court denied the appeal by a vote of 9 to 8, so you can see why I didn’t use that approach.  Olivier barely made it.
Also, the judicial doctrine of constitutional avoidance leans toward the RFRA and away from the constitutional claims.  See Bonilla v. Iowa Board of Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751, 773 (2019):
When comparing the statute and regulatory framework with constitutional requirements, we ordinarily strive to reach an interpretation that passes constitutional muster.  State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 843 N.W.2d 76, 85 (Iowa 2014) (“The doctrine of constitutional avoidance suggests the proper course in the construction of a statute may be to steer clear of ‘constitutional shoals’ when possible.”); Simmons v. State Pub. Def., 791 N.W.2d 69, 74 (Iowa 2010) (“If fairly possible, a statute will be construed to avoid doubt as to constitutionality.”).
The RFRA replaces my Free Exercise claim because it gives me the same right to argue the law violates my religious freedom.  The RFRA replaces my Establishment, Equal Protection, and Due Process, claims because it gives me a process to argue for equal protection.

Trial Preparation - August 10, 2026

Pretrial Conference on August 4, 2026

On May 28, 2026, the court denied summary judgment:

In his petition, the Petitioner asks the court to enjoin the State from interfering with the religious use of cannabis pursuant to the United States Constitution, the Iowa Constitution, and Iowa Code Chapter 675 aka Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“IRFRA”).  This court has ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments based on the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution are estopped.  Only the Petitioner’s claim under Iowa Code Chapter 675 remains.

State action shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that applying the burden to that person’s exercise of religion is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest under the IRFRA.

At this procedural posture, the court has made no determination whether there is a compelling governmental interest.  Without being able to determine whether the State’s interest is compelling, the court cannot then decide if the State has used the least restrictive means to further that interest.  The court therefore cannot grant summary judgment on this basis.

This case is about the religious use of cannabis by one person, not a religious organization or another person.  Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430 (2006) (“the person”).  Iowa Code § 675.4(1) (“that person”).  “No two persons think alike, even if they outwardly profess the same faith, so we have as many religions in Christianity as we have believers.”  Philosphy & Opinions of Marcus Garvey, edited by Amy Jacques-Garvey (Atheneum, New York 1977), at page 3.

A general interest is not sufficient.  Iowa Code § 675.4(1) (“even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability”).  O Centro, 546 at 432 (“the Government’s mere invocation of the general characteristics of Schedule I substances, as set forth in the Controlled Substances Act, cannot carry the day”).

Starting with the State’s general interest, the court must determine if that interest is compelling before deciding if the State has used the least restrictive means to further it.  If the State has no compelling interest in general enforcement, it has no compelling interest in enforcement against the Petitioner.

Some of the milestones that discredit that government’s interest in criminalizing the personal use of marijuana:

  1. 1972
    The initial classification of marijuana in 1970 federal act was controversial and a commission was created to review it.  The 1971 Iowa act was based on the federal act and classified marijuana the same way.  The 1972 Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse said the Single Convention treaty the federal act was based on does not require criminalization of personal use.  The Commission recommended the United States not criminalize marijuana.  This is an extremely clear statement that the government has no compelling interest in prohibiting the personal use of marijuana.
  2. 1988
    In 1988, after proceedings under the federal act, the administrative law judge hearing the case found that marijuana, in its natural form, is one of the safest therapetically active substances known to man.  This is an extraordinary clear statement that the government has no compelling interest in prohibiting the personal use of marijuana.
  3. 2020
    The State does not want people smoking medical marijuana, so it has authorized the principle psychoactive component of marijuana, Δ9-THC, to be extracted and sold in vaporizable form.  According to the Annual Report to the Iowa General Assembly, January 2026, at pages 22-25: (1) over 18,000 Iowans are registered to use these products; (2) products with concentrations of up to 80% pharmaceutically pure Δ9-THC in vaporizable form are used by over 90% of users; and (3) over 27% of users have waivers allowing greater amounts of Δ9-THC.  This is an extraordinary clear statement that the government has no compelling interest in prohibiting the personal use of marijuana in plant form.
  4. 2023
    According to an extensive review by the Department of Health and Human Services in 2023, the public health agency concluded, “No safety concerns were identified in our review that would indicate that the medical use of marijuana poses unacceptably high safety risks for the indications where there is some credible scientific evidence supporting its therapeutic use.” Id. at page 7.  This is an extraordinary clear statement that the government has no compelling interest in prohibiting the personal use of marijuana.