IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
CARL OLSEN
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent/Appellee.
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Polk Count No. CVCV068508
Supreme Court No. _______
APPEAL FROM THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT
FOR POLK COUNTY
HONORABLE CELENE GOGERTY, TRIAL JUDGE
APPELLANT’S BRIEF AND ARGUMENT
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the district court erred in applying the Iowa Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Iowa Code Chapter 675, to the Iowa Controlled Substances Act Iowa Code Chapter 124, by finding religious use of cannabis by the Petitioner poses a greater threat to public health and safety than the unsupervised, secular use of Δ-9 THC by over 32,000 Iowans registered under the Iowa Medical Cannabidiol Act, Iowa Code Chapter 124E.
ROUTING STATEMENT

This case should be retained by the Iowa Supreme Court because the issues raised involve substantial constitutional questions as to the validity of a statute and substantial questions of enunciating or changing legal principles.  Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(4), 6.1101(2)(a), and 6.1101(2)(f) (2025).

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action based on the Iowa Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 2024.  Iowa Code Chapter 675. 

The Petitioner/Appellant, Carl Olsen, is a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, a Rastafarian church incorporated in the country of Jamaica in 1976.  The Petitioner joined the church before it incorporated as the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church.  Prior to that it was known as one of many Rastafarian organizations in Jamaica.  The sacrament of the church is cannabis, known in Jamaica as ganja.  Town v. State ex rel. Reno, 377 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1979).  Cannabis was illegal in Jamaica until 2015 when the Jamaican Parliament authorized it for religious use by Rastafarians.  2015 Act No. 5.  Cannabis was illegal in Iowa until 2017 when the Iowa legislature authorized cultivation of cannabis to make extracts for non-prescription use in medical treatment.  Iowa Code Chapter 124E.

The State, Respondent/Appellee, cannot require membership in a religious organization as a requirement for standing to bring this action.  The RFRA applies to “the ability to act or refuse to act in a manner substantially motivated by one’s sincerely held religious belief, whether or not the exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief.”  Iowa Code § 675.3(2).  The individual members of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church believe cannabis is the sacrament, which is the reason they joined the church.  This action is based on the individul personal religious beliefs of the Petitioner/Appellant which is explicitly authorized by the RFRA.

The Petitioner did not bring this action sooner, because the State did not authorize the secular use of cannabis until 2017, Chapter 124E, and did not consent to being sued until the RFRA was enacted in 2024, Chapter 675.

The Petitioner stopped using cannabis soon after the decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), for two reasons.  First, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 495 U.S. 906 (1990), and second because the U.S. Supreme Court explained its rationale in Smith.  In Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not require the States to consider exceptions unless they already have them.  A stand-alone First Amendment claim is insufficient unless there is an additional Fourteenth Amendment claim that a State law lacks neutrality or general applicability.  The Petitioner has always received the First Amendment analysis required by Smith because both State and federal law have an exception for the religious use of peyote by the Native American Church.

As the State, Respondent/Appellee, points out, if nothing had changed between those previous cases and this one, collateral estoppel would preclude the Petitioner from making that claim again.  Nothing has changed about peyote during that time, but the popularity of cannabis has increased exponentially.  The Petitioner no longer needs an equal protection claim based on the religious use of peyote by the Native American Church, because a better example has emerged.  It would have been difficult to describe accepted use of cannabis in 1990, but now we know what it looks like, Chapter 124E.

Congress disagreed with the decision in Smith and tried to reverse it by enacting the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993, codified at 42 U.S.C. Chapter 21B, followed by the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments in 1994, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a, to protect the religious use of peyote by native Americans.  The court had the last word, and the federal RFRA was held unconstitutional as applied to the States in City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  Congress lacks the constitutional authority to force States to apply the federal RFRA to their State laws.  States began enacting their own RFRA laws after the decision in Boerne, and Iowa enacted its RFRA law in 2024.

The ruling in Smith makes several references to the Petitioner, 494 U.S. at 889 (majority opinion), 913, 914, 916, and 918 (dissenting opinion).  The dissent thought the compelling interest test was applied appropriately in Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989), but unlike federal law Oregon did not have religious or secular exceptions.  Both federal and Iowa law, 1970 and 1971, respectively, have always had an exception for religious use of peyote by the Native American Church.

It was clear to the Petitioner from the decision in Smith that: (1) both State and federal laws, 1970 and 1971, respectively, had religious exceptions for peyote that triggered a First Amendment Establishment Clause and a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause analysis, (2) the Petitioner had thorougly exhausted those claims and received strict scrutiny triggering collateral estoppel on those claims, and (3) cannabis had no accepted secular use anywhere in the United States at the time.  Not long after that, States began accepting the secular use of cannabis on a massive scale.

Cannabis and peyote are dissimilar.  Peyote is not popular.  Cannabis has always been popular, but today there are 48 States and several U.S. territories that authorize some form of non-prescription cannabis for medical treatment, all without federal authorization under 21 U.S.C. § 822(d).  Half of those States, 24 States, allow home cultivation for medical use.  Home cultivation for religious use, as requested by the Petitioner, is not a radical idea today.

Earlier this year, on April 28, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice decided to stop waiting for the States to seek authorization under 21 U.S.C. § 822(d) and granted blanket authorization to all 48 State medical marijuana programs using its authority under 21 U.S.C. § 811(d).  91 FR 22714.  That rule is being challenged in judicial review to determine whether the Attorney General exceeded his authority under 21 U.S.C. § 811(d).  Smart Approaches to Marijuana v. Department of Justice, U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, Case No. 26-1106.  A motion for a stay was denied on September 9, 2026, so the rule remains valid for now.

Private religious use of cannabis by the Petitioner does not include sharing cannabis with anyone or exposing anyone to cannabis.  The State insists that private use cannot be enforced.  But that is untrue, because the State has authorized 23,000 Iowans to use chemically engineered, highly potent THC vape devices without supervision under the condition they agree not to share THC with anyone or expose anyone to THC.  The State speculates the Petitioner will share cannabis with someone or expose someone to cannabis.  The State enforces the THC exception for users registered under Chapter 124E by revoking their registration card, and the criminal penalties for unauthorized use apply.

There is no limit on the amount of THC a user can have, but they do have give the State a limit that works for them.  A user is limited to a default amount of 4.5 grams of THC per 90 days, Iowa Code § 124E.9(14), unless they ask for more, Iowa Code § 124E.9(15)(b).  The user determines what the limit will be.  That could easily be translated into terms and conditions of an injunction, a limit the Petitioner would self-impose that can be adjusted as needed by a motion to modify the terms and conditions of the injunction.  Law enforcement would have a court order that tells them what the parameters of the injunction are so there is no guess work involved.

  Chapter 124E is an exception to Chapter 124, Iowa Code § 124.401(5)(c).  The RFRA does not autorize the court to amend legislation or create an administrative process.  The RFRA provides a judicial remedy, an injunction, which is a court order with the names of the parties (like a registration card), the terms and conditions (like the terms and conditions for using THC), and it can be revoked if those terms and conditions are violated (like revoking a registration card), and the criminal penalties for unauthorized use would apply like they would for someone without an injunction or a registration card.

The State presented no evidence at trial that the Petitioner has ever injured anyone.  The State simply says the Petitioner was in possession of a large amount of cannabis.  Both the State witnesses said under oath they would not be injured if the Petitioner possessed cannabis for personal, private religious use.  In previous cases the Petitioner did not claim the cannabis in his posession was intended solely for his own use.

The Petitioner is not going to violate the terms and conditions of an injunction by sharing cannabis with anyone or exposing anyone to cannabis.  That makes no sense.  Not only would the injunction be revoked, the Petitioner would face the same criminal penalties anyone without an injunction would face.  The enforcement priorities of the State remain intact.

The trial court erred by dismissing this claim based on speculation that the Petitioner might misbehave.  The facts the State presented were based on how someone else misbehaved, and speculation that cannabis was the cause of their bad behavior.  The facts the State presented about the Petitioner were from the long distant past, the amount of cannabis the Petitioner possessed and his intent to distribute cannabis to others.  No evidence was introduced in any of those cases that anyone was injured.

The Petitioner has previously been convicted of possessing cannabis with the intent to distribute it as part of his religious practice.  This court rejected his stand-alone First Amendment defense in State v. Olsen, 315 N.W.2d 1 (1982).  Later, after remand and re-trial, this court rejected his Fourteenth Amendment defense based on the exception for the religious use of peyote by the Native American Church, Iowa Code § 124.204(8), in an unreported opinion, State v. Olsen, No. 171-69079 (Iowa, July 18, 1984), attached to Olsen v. State of Iowa, Not Reported in F.Supp., 1986 WL 4045 (S.D.Iowa), as Appendix A.

In 1989, the U.S. Court of Appeals rejected his administrative petition, 21 C.F.R. § 1308.43, for a religious exemption based on the exemption for the religious use of peyote by the Native American Church, 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 906 (1990).

Finally, in 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals rejected his Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) Petition for a religious exemption based on the exemption for the religious use of peyote by the Native American Church, 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Olsen v. Holder, 556 U.S. 1221 (2009).  The Eighth Circuit held the RFRA inapplicable to the State of Iowa persuant to City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), re-affirmed the decision in Olsen v. DEA, and held the Petitioner has always received strict scrutiny on his peyote religion claim.  Id., 541 F.3d at 832.

Collateral estoppel precludes the Petitioner from relitigating any of these previous rulings based on the religious use of peyote by the Native American Church and the Petitioner has not alleged any of them were decided incorrectly.  This case raises facts and issues that were not previously considered in those cases:

The Iowa Controlled Substances Act, Iowa Code Chapter 124, is unconstitutional on its face.  The exception for the religious use of peyote by the Native American Church, Iowa Code Chapter 124E, violates the Establishment clause of the First Amendment.  The peyote exception is the reason the Petitioner received strict scrutiny in previous cases before the RFRA came into existence.

Another constitutional violation has been added to the Iowa Controlled Substances Act, Iowa Code Chapter 124.  The exception for the secular use of cannabis in the Iowa Medical Cannanbis Act, Iowa Code Chapter 124E, unfairly discriminates against religious use of cannabis by the Petitioner and provides no means for redress.  Chapter 124 treats possesion of THC without a prescription more favorably than comparable religious exercise and provides no process by which the Petitioner can bring a claim.  Chapter 124 violates both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny”).

The trial court held that these constitutional claim were precluded by collateral estoppel because the Petitioner previously lost a challenge to the constitutionality of the Iowa Controlled Substances Act, Iowa Code Chapter 124, based on an exception for a different controlled substance, peyote.  The secular exception for cannabis did not exist at the time those cases were decided and a new constitutional claim now exists that has never been considered before.

STATEMENT OF FACTS